




The regulation of occupations has a long and varied
history. Among the oldest evidence of rules governing
occupations is the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, 
which stipulates both the fees that patients were obliged
to pay for medical services and the punishments that
practitioners faced for negligent treatment. And in The
Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith commented on the ability
of the crafts to lengthen apprenticeship programmes and
limit the number of apprentices per master, thus ensuring
higher earnings for people in those professions.
In modern times, occupational regulation has become
pervasive in western industrialised nations. In the United
States, for example, the proportion of workers whose
occupation requires them to have a licence from the
government to perform their work has grown nearly six-
fold during the last 50 years to reach about 29% of the
workforce. Adding in people whose occupation involves
some kind of government certification means that about
38% of the workforce has some permission requirements
from the government to work for pay.
Earlier this year, a symposium at CEP explored the role
that governments and non-profit organisations play in
precluding individuals from working in an occupation for
pay. It also examined whether occupational regulations
provide higher quality services and greater health and
safety benefits, as well as eliminating consumer
uncertainty about the services.
Building on the strong industrial relations tradition of
multidisciplinary interactions between academics and
practitioners, the symposium included scholars from
industrial relations, economics, public policy and sociology
as well as practitioners and officials from the Council on
Licensure, Enforcement and Regulation (CLEAR), an
international organisation of occupational regulation
professionals.
The papers ranged from analyses of national-level
occupational licensing institutions to specific issues within
specific occupations – and from an analysis of the avenues
for enforcing occupational regulation of the offshoring of
radiology in different countries to access to care within a
country’s dental profession. This diversity underscores the
complexity of the globalisation of occupational regulation
and the need for fresh analytical approaches to a topic
that is at the core of labour market regulation.
Occupational licensing in 
the United States
In the 1950s, one in 20 US workers were required to have
a licence from an agency of the US government to be able
to do their job. A paper by Morris Kleiner and Alan
Krueger finds that in 2006, the proportion was nearing
one in three workers. Occupational regulation in the
United States now affects many times more workers than
unionisation, which encompasses roughly 12% of the
workforce. Moreover, the effect of licensing on wages –
raising them by around 15% – is similar to the impact of
unions on wages. 
A paper by Joseph Hotz and Mo Xiao examines childcare
provision in the United States and finds that the effects of
state-level quality standards that specify the labour
intensiveness of childcare services are strikingly different
from those that specify staff qualifications. Requirements
for higher staff-child ratios deter entry of new providers
and reduce the number of operating childcare
establishments. Requirements for higher staff educational
qualifications do not deter new entry, but they do have
the unintended effects of discouraging accreditation,
reducing owners’ profits and driving firms out of business.
Comparison of cross-national approaches to occupational
regulation is a key issue in the internationalisation of
work. A paper by Kyoung-Hee Yu and Frank Levy
examines variations in a specific case – the offshoring of
diagnostic radiology in Singapore, the UK and the United
States – to show how differences in national institutions
continue to affect market transactions of professional
services in a globalised world.
All three countries are offshoring diagnostic radiological
readings, but primarily for reasons other than cost. The
United States offshores radiology to US board-certified
radiologists who are located abroad. The UK offshores
radiology largely to radiologists trained in other European
Union (EU) countries. But only Singapore of the three
countries offshores any significant amount of work to India. 
Occupational regulation in the
European Union
In contrast with the long history of research on
occupational licensing in North America and the detailed
data that are available there, there has been relatively little
examination of occupational licensing in the EU.
Occupational licensing – where working for pay in an occupation (such as teaching,
dentistry, accountancy and the law) requires government permission – is a growing
phenomenon. Alex Bryson and Morris Kleiner organised a symposium at CEP to
explore the impact on earnings, employment and access to services.
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A paper by Francis Kramarz and colleagues examines the
influence of the abolition of compulsory conscription (the
draft) in France on the acquisition of driving licences by
young men (something that had been effectively subsidised
through their acquisition while in the army) and the effects
on both labour supply and the demand for driving
instructors. The results show that abolition of the draft
resulted in increased rents for driving instructors because
heavy entry regulations ensured that demand for driving
instructors outstripped supply.
A paper by David Metcalf discusses how in the UK, policies
are being adopted on immigration that take into account
the relative supply and demand aspects of the occupation.
Moreover, occupations regularly lobby to limit the numbers
within the occupation in government agencies. 
Case studies
Occupational regulation influences wages, employment and
consumers differently depending on the stage and level of
regulation. For example, funeral directors in the United
States are required to learn practices such as embalming
that are used infrequently, but are expensive in terms of
both money and time to master. The result, according to a
paper by Alison Cathles and colleagues, is a reduction in
the supply of female practitioners and an increase in the
earnings of funeral directors. Similarly, a paper by Tanya
Wanchek shows that the number of hygienists is limited by
state laws that reduce consumers’ access to dental care, but
raise the earnings of this female-dominated occupation.
A key overarching aspect for the labour market is the
influence of occupational licensing on wage determination.
A paper by Mario Pagliero finds that for US attorneys, more
difficult state-by-state exams directly translate into higher
salaries for lawyers. Similarly, a paper by Robert Thornton
and Edward Timmons shows that for barbers in the United
States, tougher statutory restrictions for barbers are
associated with higher salaries.
Policy implications
The papers presented at the symposium support the
interpretation that occupational licensing serves as a means
to enforce entry barriers to a profession that raise wages
and reduce employment without any demonstrable
benefits to consumers. For occupations to continue to be
licensed or for licensing of occupations that are currently
unlicensed, it must be shown that they are enhancing
consumer well-being.
The estimates of the relationship between occupational
licensing and wages is consistent with the idea that
members of an occupation raise wages by using the powers
of government to drive up requirements and capture work
for the regulated workers. These estimates suggest a strong
role for the monopoly face of licensing in the labour
market. Indeed, the wage premium associated with
licensing is strikingly similar to that found in studies of the
effect of unions on wages.
This article summarises the issues and papers
discussed at ‘The International Symposium on the
Government Regulation of Occupations’, jointly
organised by CEP and the British Journal of Industrial
Relations and held at CEP in March 2009
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/events/event.asp?id=66).
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